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Tennessee Law and the Sales Article of the
Uniform Commercial Code
W. Harold Bigham*
On July 1, 1964, the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in
Tennessee. The author here explains the provisions of the Code dealing
with sales and compares these provisions with the former Tennessee
law of sales.
Although much of the interest engendered by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has centered around Article 9-Secured Transactions,
and although Article 9 has been described as the heart of the Code,
Article 2-Sales-is half again as long, is in many ways more iconoc-
lastic,' and has precipitated perhaps more criticism than any of the
other articles of the Code.2 Article 2 contains some innovations
which are, at least upon initial impression, startling departures from
traditional concepts of sales law, and it is therefore not surprising
that there has been a spate of legal literature published on various
aspects of this article.3 Since limitations of space prohibit a section by
section discussion of Article 2, and the effect thereof upon prior
Tennessee law, we must necessarily limit our discussion to those areas
where Article 2 departs most drastically from commonly accepted
*Member, Gullett, Steele & Sanford, Nashville, Tenn.; former Editor-in-Chief,
Vanderbilt Law Review, 1959-60.
1. "Some of these provisions [of the Code] are not only iconoclastic but open to
criticisms that I regard so fundamental as to preclude the desirability of enacting this
part at least of the proposed Code." Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAnv. L. 11Ev. 561 (1950).
2. The more vociferous critics have been Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (?) Com-
mercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE LJ. 334 '(1952); Hall, Article 2-Sales
-"From Status to Contract?," 1952 Wis. L. ryEv. 209; Murphy, Some Problems Con-
cerning Sellers' Remedies Under the Amended Uniform Commercial Code in Pennsyl-
vania, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 273 (1960); Williston, supra note 1.
3. There is in GoonascH & WoimcN, A STORY OF = AsmucAN LAw INSTT-uTE
55-57 (1961) (selected bibliography), a list of articles and comments on Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code published through 1961. Professor Corman of
Rutgers University has brought this bibliography up to the latter part of 1962, Corman,
The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUTrrns L. 11Ev. 14
(1962). The following are those articles published since Corman's compilation which
the writer finds of interest: Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 127 (1963); Mahon, Remedies in Sales Disputes
Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Notes for the Litigator, 31 Fo nnH L. REV.
727 (1963); Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sales of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: a Road Map for Article 2, 73 YALE LJ. 199
(1963); Tisdale, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Law of Contracts, 39
N.D.L. REv. 7 (1963); Note, 43 B.U.L. REv. 396 (1963); Note, 30 U. Cm. L. REv.
540 (1963).
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rules of sales and contract law now existing under the statutory and
decisional law of Tennessee.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which supersedes the
Uniform Sales Act4 in Tennessee, is divided into seven parts, one-
hundred-four sections, and comprises approximately one-fourth of the
entire Code. Although it is impossible to conclude with any mathe-
matical precision, it seems safe to say that the overwhelming majority
of the problems with which the practitioner and the jurist are faced
in the area of sales revolve around the questions of when title to the
goods passes and secondly whether there is an enforceable contract
for the sale of goods. The former issue, which is perhaps the more
formidable of the two, has traditionally been resolved by a formula
utilizing variously the ascertainment of intention of the parties and
the circumstances and usage of the trade involved.- The Uniform
Sales Act furnishes some guidelines which are helpful in determining
whether title had passed, but the act is, on the whole, silent as to
when an enforceable contract to sell comes into existence, and that
issue is left to be resolved by the application of traditional rules of
contract. After midnight, June 30, 1964, the jocular query among
lawyers, "title, title, who has the title?" is no longer appropriate
or useful, for Article 2 all but abandons the concept of title as a tool
for solving sales law problems. Furthermore, on the assumption that
ordinary principles of contract law have not worked well in their
application to the practices of the commercial world, the draftsmen
of the Uniform Commercial Code have substituted therefor principles
more nearly approximating the actual practices and understanding
of the businessman and merchant.
Although Article 2 introduces into the law of sales a great many
terms and concepts which are alien to the lawyer's discipline, it is
submitted that the efforts of lawyers and judges to fit actual business
practices into a Procrustean bed of traditional legal concepts, in the
form of the Uniform Sales Act and traditional principles of contract
law, have not been altogether successful or happy. Any attempt,
4. The Uniform Sales Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1201 to 47-1277 (1956) [herein-
after cited U.S.A.] was enacted in Tennessee in 1919 and has been adopted in 37 states
of the United States.
The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted as chapter 81 of the Public Acts of 1963
and Article 2-Sales is codified as TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-101 to -2-725 (repl. vol.
1964).
5. See, e.g., State ex rel. Day Pulverizer Co. v. Fitts, 166 Tenn. 156, 60 S.W.2d 167
(1933); Knoxville Tinware & Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 158 Tenn. 126, 11 S.W.2d 874
(1928); Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924); Sanford v.
Keef, 140 Tenn. 368, 204 S.W. 1154 (1918); Sindle v. American Ry. Express Co., 8
Tenn. App. 594 (M.S. 1928); Mayer v. Catron, 48 S.W. 255 (E.S. Tenn. Ch. App.
1898).
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therefore, more nearly to pattern the law in conformity with accepted
business practice and understanding is laudable.6
I. DEFINITIONS
Many of the definitions in Article 2 are new, in that they have
no exact counterpart in existing law, while others modify or restate
recognized terms. Competent statutory interpretation in any context
requires close scrutiny of the "definitions" section of the statute under
consideration, if any. A fortiori, this is true of the "definitions" pro-
visions of Article 2,7 where familiar words are given meanings utterly
unfamiliar to the average practitioner.
Undoubtedly, the most significant and radical departure from tra-
ditional law, as far as the new definitions of Article 2 are concerned,
is the introduction by the Code of the term "merchant." Section 2-104
(1) defines this new creature thusly:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of a kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowl-
edge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker
or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having
such knowledge or skill.
It is this term "merchant" which has caused the greatest controversy
among legal writers and others.8
Under the Uniform Sales Act, with a few exceptions, 9 controversies
are resolved by the application of legal rules which are not "respecters
of persons." Thus liability in any given case did not depend upon
whether or not the buyer or seller was a professional in his particular
field. Article 2 of the code, however, includes a number of sections
containing two standards for such circumstances: one for the non-
6. Although it is early to be making predictions, the Uniform Commercial Code has
been in effect in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts for some years, and the experience
with Article 2 has been a very satisfactory one, with a considerable decrease in the
amount of litigation. See Del Duca, Commercial Code Litigation: Conflicts of Law;
Sales, 65 DicK. L. REv. 287 (1961); Malcolm and Funk, Pennsylvania and Massachu-
setts Experience under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Bus. LAW. 525 (1961).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-104 to -2-107 (repl. vol. 1964).
8. Hall, Article 2-Sales-"From Status to Contract?," 1952 WIs. L. REv. 209; Wil-
liston, Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAav. L. REv. 561
(1950); Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code Before the New York Law
Revision Commission, NEW YoRic LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 1305, 1456
(1954) [hereinafter cited N.Y.L.R. CoMM'N REP.].
9. Uniform Sales Act § 15 imposes an implied warranty of quality on the dealer or
merchant which was not imposed on other sellers. U.S.A. § 16(c), TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-1216(c) (1956), imposed an implied warranty where there was a sale by sample
by a seller who was "a dealer in goods of that kind." See also UNIFORM BmL OF
LADING AcT §§ 35, 37.
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merchant and a second higher and more demanding standard for the
merchant or for transactions between merchants.10
Upon first examination it would appear that Article 2 makes a
bipartite categorization of the individuals to whom specialized rules
will be applied; closer scrutiny reveals, however, that there are
three groups of individuals to whom varied rules apply. Some of the
specialized rules, which appear only in Article 2, are premised on
normal and ordinary practices in any type of business and are rules
with which a person of even a modicum of common sense or business
sense should be acquainted. On the other hand, referring again to
the definition of "merchant," it is seen that Section 2-104(1) includes
within its definition of the term "merchant" not only the professional
who deals in goods of a kind, but also those persons who, by their
occupation, hold themselves out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction. Thus, there is
a second group of rules prescribing special legal consequences where
a party is a merchant with respect to the particular type goods in-
volved; while still a third type of rule has references to "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" applicable to
persons who are merchants under either the "goods" or the "prac-
tices" aspect of the definition of merchant."
Article 2's introduction into Tennessee law of the idea that parties
to a sales contract should be treated differently according to their
experience and knowledge is a radical departure from existing law.
It is also true that juries will be faced with some difficult questions as
to whether parties to litigation are "merchants" vel non.'2 To the
10. There are some 14 sections of Article 2 which contain special provisions of this
nature: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-103(1)(b) (repl. vol. 1964) ("good faith"); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-104(1), 47-2-104(3) (repl. vol. 1964) ("merchant", "between
merchants"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-201(2) (repl. vol. 1964) (formal requirements,
Statute of Frauds); TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-205 (repl. vol. 1964) (firm offers);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-207(2) (repl. vol. 1964) (additional terms in con-
tract acceptance); TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-209(2) (repl. vol. 1964) (agreement
to modification or rescission); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-314(1) (repl. vol. 1964)
(implied warranty merchantability); TaNiN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-327(1)(c) (repl. vol.
1964) (merchant's obligations upon election to return goods received under a sale on
approval); TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-402(2) (repl. vol. 1964) (retention of possession
of goods by seller after sale or identification); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-403(2) (repl.
vol. 1964) (merchant's power to transfer entrusted goods); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-2-509(3) (repl. vol. 1964) (passage of risk of loss when the seller is a merchant);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-603(1) (repl. vol. 1964) (merchant buyer's duties as to
rightfully rejected goods); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-605(1)(b) (repl. vol. 1964)
(waiver of buyer's objections by failure to particularize); TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-
2-609(2) (repl. vol. 1964) (right of adequate assurance of performance between
merchants).
11. See discussion in Whiteside, Uniform Commercial Code-Major Changes in Sales
Law, 49 Ky. LJ. 163, 170 (1960).
12. It has been suggested that "it is highly likely that there will be litigation over
who is a 'merchant'; it may often be a jury question," Holahan, Contract Formalities
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 ViLL. L. REV. 1, 23 (1957).
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author these do not appear to be valid objections, if they be con-
sidered as such. In the first place, it is certainly not true that all
persons to all contracts are "equal before the law" in any real sense
of the term in areas outside of sales transactions, for in many contexts
the law, and particularly equity, treats persons differently according
to their experience and knowledge. 13 Secondly, even if experience
bears out expressed fears that the question of who is and who is not
a "merchant" may be a troublesome issue in almost every case, it is
hard to conceive that it will be a more difficult issue than, for example,
questions of contributory negligence in tort cases.
II. Fo~mv, FORMATION AND READJUSTmNT OF THM CONTRAcr
A. Statute of Frauds
Both the Statute of Frauds as contained in the Uniform Sales Act
in Tennessee 14 and the Statute of Frauds provision of Article 2, section
2-201,15 prohibit the enforcement of contracts for the sale of goods
equalling or exceeding five-hundred dollars in value unless in writing.
16
Beyond this similarity, these two provisions have little in common,
and the new Statute of Frauds will make a significant-if not drastic-
alteration in existing Tennessee law. Whether one agrees with Willis-
ton that section 2-201 is, with the exception of section 2-401 (which
diminishes the importance of title), the most iconoclastic provision
within the Code,'7 or with Rabel that the Statute of Frauds is "a
thoroughly antiquated legislative trick, which has so often misfired that
the old law has been called the Statute for frauds and 'the refuge of
the welcher,"'1s one must conclude that the draftsmen of the Code
have made an attempt to hew a line somewhere between these oppos-
ing points of view. Whether this new hybrid will work well in practice
remains to be seen. Indeed one is almost compelled to conclude that
the draftsmen of the code would have preferred to omit the Statute
of Frauds altogether, but as Corman has pointed out, "changes in the
13. For example an insurance contract is construed most favorably to the insured
and strictly against the insurer. See, e.g., Woods v. City of La Follette, 185 Tenn. 655,
207 S.W.2d 572 (1948).
14. TEN. CODE ANN. § 47-1204 (1956).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-201 (repl. vol. 1964).
16. The $500 monetary amount necessary to make applicable the Statute of Frauds,
as set out in the Uniform Sales Act, is stated as a "value" limit. It has been suggested
that subsection 2-201(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code which sets a "price" limit
may represent a change. This is so, because "value" may very well represent a broader
concept than "price." See HAWKLAND, SALES AND Brn SALEs UNDER THE UNwFonRa
COMmmECIAL CODE, 32, 22 (1958).
17. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63
HAv. L. 1REv. 561, 573 (1950).
18. label, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. Cm. L. REv.
427, 433 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
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method of satisfying the requirements of the Statute of Frauds . . .
[reflecting] a liberalization of written formality requirements and a
de-emphasis of permissive use of the alternate method of part perform-
ance of oral agreements made between merchants . . ." were chosen
as an alternative to the almost insuperable task of obtaining legislative
agreement to the omission of the Statute of Frauds.19
Section 2-201(1) lessens the rigid requirements of section 4 of the
Uniform Sales Act 20 that the memorandum must contain itself every
essential term of the contract to be enforced.21 This subsection merely
requires that the writing be sufficient to indicate that a contract of sale
has been made between the parties, that it be signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or his authorized agent, and that
a quantity be stated. An error as to the quantity in the memorandum
prevents enforcement of the agreement beyond that quantity, thereby
making the quantity term "the heart" of the sales contract; comment
1 to section 2-201(1) points out that:
[The required writing] . . . need not indicate which party is the buyer and
which the seller. The only term which must appear is a quantity term
which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount
stated. The price, time and place of payment or delivery, the general qual-
ity of the goods, or any particular warranties may all be omitted.
Subsection 2-201(2) makes an innovation in the Statute of Frauds
and at the same time corrects a situation fraught with inequity. This
is the situation where X and Y enter into an oral contract for the sale
of goods, perhaps by telephone, and one of the palties immediately
sends a letter of confirmation to the other. The sender of the letter of
confirmation, of course, has signed a memorandum which would satisfy
the Statute of Frauds under the Uniform Sales Act, but the recipient
thereof has signed no memorandum and may sit blithely by and
"watch the market." Under the Code this artful dodger will no longer
be able to ply his trade, for he too will be bound, unless he objects to
the contents of the letter of confirmation within ten days of its
receipt.22
19. Corman, supra note 3, at 23.
20. TEN . CODE ANN. § 47-1204 (1956).
21. See, e.g., Cashin v. Markwalter, 208 Ga. 444, 67 S.E.2d 226 (1951); Bauer v.
Victory Catering Co., 101 N.J.L. 364, 128 Ati. 262 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925); Wool
Prod. v. Buff, 109 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
22. "Of course, the effect of the subsection, at least, is to take away the protection
of the Statute of Frauds from one who has unreasonably failed to reply to a letter of
confirmation. The burden of proving that a contract was in fact made is not affected
by it, and it will not be easy to use the provision in the perpetration of fraud. For
example, a fraudulent party who sends out a letter of confirmation when no oral agree-
ment has been made might succeed in using subsection 2-201(2) to deprive a foolish
victim of the protection of the Statute of Frauds, but he would not be able to recover
unless he could prove the existence of a contract, and, in this respect, subsection
[VOL. 17
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Under the Uniform Sales Act, the Statute of Frauds can also be satis-
fied when the buyer accepts and receives part of the goods or gives
something in earnest to bind the contract or in part payment.2 Under
that section a partial payment or partial acceptance validated the en-
tire transaction against the Statute of Frauds, and not merely the
executed portion. The vice inherent in this exception to the Statute of
Frauds under the Uniform Sales Act was that it made it possible for
the unscrupulous seller or buyer to watch fluctuations in the market
and by a small shipment or a small payment expand an oral contract
for the sale of a small amount of goods into a very large contract.2
Of course, partial performance tends to prove the existence of the con-
tract, but it does not provide any reasonably certain basis for ascer-
taining the quantity agreed upon, thereby making perjury attractive.
Subsection 2-201(3) (c)2 corrects this rule by providing that partial
performance of an oral contract satisfies the Statute of Frauds only to
the extent that goods have been accepted and actually received or
that payment has been made and accepted. Were it not for the provi-
sion of the Code, discussed earlier, permitting the validation of oral
sales contracts by letters of confirmation, this new part performance
provision would be subject to serious abuse.
Tennessee and most other jurisdictions have generally denied appli-
cation of the Statute of Frauds to contracts for sales of goods manu-
factured especially for the buyer and not suitable for sale to others in
the ordinary course of the seller's business. 26 Such a contract is usually
2-201(2) would help him not at all. There is some danger, of course, that the
fraudulent party might persuade the trier of fact that a contract was made prior to the
written confirmation, but, on balance it would seem that this is a small price to pay for
the many positive benefits effected by the subsection." I-wKLAN, supra note 16, at
29.
23. The Tennessee courts have been accused of applying the doctrine of part per-
formance to contracts for the sale of goods and choses in action, without specifically
requiring that performance be tantamount either to delivery of part of the goods, or
acceptance of something in earnest or part payment, and in so doing they have set
up a "judicially constructed avenue for escaping the Statute of Frauds ... [which] is
without foundation in the statute." Hartman, Contracts-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13
VAND. L. Rnv. 1035, 1046 (1960). The cases most severely criticized by Professor
Hartman are Foust v. Carney, 205 Tenn. 604, 329 S.W.2d 825 (1959); Buice v.
Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952); and Ashley v. Preston, 162
Tenn. 540, 39 S.W.2d 279 (1931).
It is to be noted that TENN. CODE ANt. § 47-2-201(1) (repl. vol. 1964), eliminates
the term "choses in action," used in § 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, and such cases as
Buice v. Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952) involving the sale
of corporate shares of stock will now be governed by the Statute of Frauds contained
in TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-8-319 (repl. vol. 1964).
24. See I-AwrAND, supra note 16, at 30.
25. TENr. CODE ANN. 9 47-2-201(3) (c) (repl. vol. 1964).
26. Anderson-Gregory Co. v. Lea, 370 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn. 1963); 1 WmLiSToN,
SALES § 55 (rev. ed. 1948).
1964]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
treated as one for work and labor.27 The Code qualifies these decisions
by adding a further requirement to withdraw contracts of this kind
from the Statute, namely, that the seller, before notice of repudiation,
have made a "substantial' beginning of manufacture, or have "made
commitments" for procuring goods. Williston is critical of this new
provision because he thinks it "undesirable to extend the Statute of
Frauds to cases not heretofore within it, and also to introduce ques-
tions of what is a 'substantial' beginning and what is 'commitment. "' 28
Neither criticism appears valid to the writer; in the first place, in-
herent in the manufacturer exception to the Statute of Frauds is a
policy decision that the seller has changed position to his detriment in
manufacturing goods saleable only to the purchaser, and if he has not
thus relied upon the oral commitment to purchase by making a "sub-
stantial" beginning, it is difficult to justify taking the case out of the
Statute, as has been the wont of the courts heretofore. In the second
place, resolution of the issue as to whether the manufacturer has made
a "substantial" beginning presents the same type of problem before a
court where an offeree in a unilateral contract situation alleges that he
has begun performance. 29 After all, courts are created to resolve diffi-
cult issues.
One other provision of the Statute of Frauds in the Code deserves
comment at this point. Under section 2-201(3) (b) "if a party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony, or
otherwise in court that a contract sale was made," this will satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, but only to the extent of the quantity which he
admits. The similarities of this new rule to the doctrine of estoppel are
obvious. The immediate problem which comes to mind is whether a
demurrer to a declaration or an original bill will amount to an in-court
admission by the defendant that a contract for sale is made in Tennes-
see. In view of the fact that a demurrer in this state admits all facts
well pleaded in the plaintiff's pleading,30 it would seem highly ad-
visable, as has been suggested,31 that the legislature amend the
27. Anderson-Gregory v. Lea, supra note 26; see also C. W. Rantoul Co. v. Clare-
mont Paper Co., 196 Fed. 305 (1st Cir. 1912); Mixer v. I-Iowarth, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.)
205 (1839).
28. Williston, supra note 1, at 575.
29. Cf. Hutchison v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 S.W.2d
6 (M.S. 1946); RsTATEME,_NT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
30. See, e.g., Deaton v. Vise, 186 Tenn. 364, 210 S.W.2d 655 (1948); Farris v.
Yellow Cab Co., 189 Tenn. 46, 222 S.W.2d 187 (1949); Jones v. Allied Am. Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 38 Tenn. App. 362, 274 S.W.2d 525 (E.S. 1954).
31. The Statute of Frauds may be raised in Tennessee by a demurrer. Buice v.
Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 267 S.W.2d 119 (1954). See Corman, supra note
3, at 22.
It is to be hoped that, in the absence of such amendment, the Tennessee courts
would follow the case of Beter v. Helman, 41 West. 7 (Westmoreland Co. Ct., Pa.
1958), in which it was held that a demurrer to a petition to enjoin the defendants from
[VOL. 17
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Code to incorporate a procedural rule permitting the statute to be
raised as a defense in a preliminary pleading which is not responsive
to the declaration or original bill, as is true of a demurrer.
B. Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule, which is a rule of substantive law,32 for-
bids the admission of evidence to contradict or vary the terms or to
enlarge or diminish the obligation of a written instrument or deed,
except upon grounds of fraud, accident or mistake.33 Section 2-202 of
the Uniform Commercial Code4 "loosens up" the parol evidence rule
by abolishing the presumption that a writing (apparently complete)
is a total integration, "a complete and exclusive statement of the terms
agreed," and by requiring the court to make finding that the parties
intended a total integration, before "consistent additional terms"
(parol) are to be excluded. 35 The principal effect of this section will
be to shift the presumption of finality under existing Tennessee law
with respect to sales contracts to one of partial integration-a substan-
tial change. Additionally, the Code permits the admission of parol evi-
dence to show a course of prior dealings between the parties, customs
and usages of the trade, and even consistent additional terms, without
requiring a condition precedent of ambiguity of the terms.
One immediately obvious benefit of the new parol evidence rule as
selling or transferring a business which they bad allegedly agreed, by parol, to sell the
plaintiff was not an absolute admission of fact in the pleading and the alleged oral
agreement was therefore unenforceable. In so holding the court observed that "a
demurrer is not an absolute admission of any fact, but simply it admits those facts for
the sole purpose of handling their legal sufficiency as determined by the courts." 41
West. at 12.
32. De'aver v. J. C. Mahan Motor Co., 163 Tenn. 429; 43 S.W.2d 199 (1931).
33. Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S.W. 914 (1896); Littlejohn v. Fowler, 45
Tenn. 284 (1868); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn. App. 434, 134 S.W.2d
197 (M.S. 1939).
34. TENN. CODE AtN. § 47-2-202 (repl. vol. 1964).
35. There is a peculiar anomaly in Tennessee with respect to the procedural aspect
of the parol evidence rule. According to McCormick, Cobb v. Wallace, 45 Tenn. 539
(1868), is the first case in the United States to suggest that it is for the jury to decide
whether the writing introduced embraced all the terms of the previous parol contract.
McComzncK, EVIDENc E § 214 (1954). The rule of Cobb v. Wallace has been followed
subsequently. See Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 159, 33 S.W. 914, 916 (1896):
"The question as to whether the entire contract was reduced to writing, or an inde-
pendent, collateral agreement was made, was a question of fact; and, when there was
any evidence to sustain the contention, it was a matter for the jury to determine, and
not for the court."
These cases are reversed by TErN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-202(b) (repl. vol. 1964),
which provides that a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to the terms of the contract may be contradicted by evidence of
prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be explained or supple-
mented "by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement." (Emphasis added.)
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set forth in the Code is the abrogation of the infamous Lord Bacon's
maxim which forbids the use of oral evidence to explain or resolve a
patent ambiguity, but admits oral evidence to explain a latent am-
biguity. This is so because ambiguity of no kind will now be needed.
In all candor it must be admitted few will mourn its demise. As Pro-
fessor Morgan has forcefully pointed out,36 the Tennessee courts have
been forced into some ridiculous mental gymnastics in an attempt to
do justice where the ambiguity was really patent, rather than latent,
but the circumstances cried out for the admission of the proffered oral
evidence.
C. Formation of the Contract
Every sale is a contract, and of necessity the draftsmen of the Uni-
form Commercial Code in their efforts to modify and modernize the
law of sales to conform with common and accepted business practices,
were driven to altering or repudiating some hornbook principles of
contract law. To be sure, some sacred cows which many of us have
worshiped since our first semester in law school have been rather
rudely slaughtered by Article 2. Among the more traditional minded,
these modifications of pure contract law, as applied to sales, may be
somewhat harder to digest than even more radical innovations con-
tained in Article 2, which are purely matters of sales law. For example,
under the Code, the offeror no longer has complete control of his offer;
acceptances to be effective need not comply in every respect with the
offer; recovery may now be had on an executory contract even though
the price is not fixed in the contract. An agreement modifying a sales
contract needs no consideration to be binding; and, as discussed
earlier, whether an ambiguity in a sales contract is latent or patent will
no longer be a factor in determining whether or not parol evidence
varying the terms of the contract may be introduced. These modifica-
tions represent significant changes in the statutory and decisional law
of Tennessee.
It has been said by a much-quoted encyclopedia of law that the
formation of a contract requires that there be a meeting of minds of the
parties "at the same time."37 It is questionable whether there is real
support for such a statement, in the law of Tennessee or elsewhere, but
it is true that assent to an offer to purchase is a prerequisite to the
formation of a contract or an agreement, and there are many circum-
stances in which the specified time at which the contract came into
existence may be important.
Section 2-204 of the Code modifies substantially the requirement of
36. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. Ruv. 895,
906 (1954).
37. 17 C.S., Contracts § 31 (1963).
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mutual assent and adds or substitutes new rules as to formation of con-
tracts for sale which are inconsistent with, and in some significant re-
spects contrary to, Tennessee case law. The court is permitted to find
the existence of a contract even though no specific time can be pointed
to as the "birthday of the contract," and "even though one or more
terms are left open." The contract for sale "does not fail for indefinite-
ness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." It has
been stated that "in these respects its purpose is apparently to em-
power or require courts to give legal consequences to the rough-hewn
deals of businessmen, even though they lack the precision which the
judicial mind would find indispensable in an award of damages or
specific performance."
38
If there is anything well settled in the law of contracts, it is that an
offer for which no consideration has been given, may be withdrawn by
the offeror at any time prior to acceptance by the offeree, regardless
of promises by the former that such revocation will not take place.
39
The Code abolishes the need for consideration in order to make a
written "firm" offer irrevocable for a reasonable time or during a speci-
fied time in the offer, thus making it possible for an offeror deliberately
to make his offer irrevocable without requiring the offeree to pay a
consideration for an "option." The new Code provision does fix an ab-
solute limitation of three months upon irrevocability, subject to re-
newals and requires a separate signature by the offeror in the event
that the term of irrevocability is contained within a form supplied by
the offeree.
It is to be noted that the new section specifically recognizes that
offers are "ordinarily" revocable, and one possible difficulty is the de-
termination by a court or an attorney in advising his client as to what
will constitute a "firm" offer, within the meaning of section 2-205. It
has been suggested that the following language would almost certainly
be held to constitute a "firm" offer: 40 "This offer shall be irrevocable
for ten days," or "this offer shall be irrevocable," or "we offer you
irrevocably," or "the foregoing offer is not to be withdrawn before
November 1."
Although section 2-205 contains provisions which are contrary to the
familiar rule that offers unsupported by consideration may be with-
drawn at any time prior to their acceptance, there is no valid reason
why a person should not be held to such a promise, consideration or no
38. 1 N.Y.L.R. CoMb'N REP. 602 (1955).
39. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Clements Paper Co., 193 Tenn. 6, 241 S.W.2d
851 (1951); Akers v. J. B. Sedberry, Inc., 39 Tenn. App. 633, 286 S.W.2d 617 (M.S.
1955).
40. 1 N.Y.L.R. Comrm'N REP. 614 (1955).
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consideration.41 Section 2-205 represents another section of the Code
seriously curtailing the activities of the unscrupulous market-watcher,
and is a significant improvement over the former Tennessee rule.
The Code abolishes the technical requirement that an acceptance
be transmitted to the offeror by the same medium of communication
used by the offeror in order to make a binding contract, the only re-
quirement being that the medium be reasonable under the circum-
stances; however, the Code would not circumvent a stipulation by the
offeror that the offeree use a particular medium for acceptance. There
is no doubt that men who make offers in the buying and selling of
goods are ordinarily not as exacting about the kind of acceptance
(promise or performance) wanted as the courts have made them seem.
More often than not there is no reason why the offeror, unless he has
clearly stipulated the manner of acceptance, should be able to raise
the technical defense that the offeree accepted in the wrong way.
Generally speaking, when this defense is raised, it is utilized to avoid
a deal which no longer appears as attractive as it did when the offer
was made, usually because of a change in market conditions.
To some extent, section 2-20642 in permitting acceptance of an offer
to make a contract "in any manner and by a medium reasonable in
the circumstances" blurs the distinction between the unilateral con-
tract where performance is sought in return for a promise, and a bi-
lateral contract where promises are exchanged by the contracting
parties. In addition, the section is a substantial alteration of the Ten-
nessee rule, reflected by many cases43 that the acceptance must exactly
match the offer, i.e., that the acceptance of an offer must be unquali-
fied and must not vary from the terms of the offer.
Section 2-207 is a related provision and is likewise a radical depar-
ture from the general rule, which was the rule in Tennessee, that ac-
ceptance of an offer must exactly and precisely accord with the terms
of an offer. Contrary to these rules, in transactions between merchants,
the Code recognizes, with certain exceptions, acceptances or confirma-
tions containing variations from the offer as forming a contract, even
though they may be additional to or different from the offer. Section
2-207 has already produced problems in judicial interpretation, provok-
ing the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to com-
ment that "this statute is not too happily drafted."44
41. It is to be noted that TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-2-205 (repl. vol. 1964), applies
only to offers made by a "merchant."
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-206 (repl. vol. 1964).
43. Ray v. Thomas, 191 Tenn. 195, 232 S.W.2d 32 (1950); Canton Cotton Mills v.
Bowman Overall Co., 149 Tenn. 18, 257 S.W. 398 (1923); Armistead v. Tenn. Consol.
Coal Co., 14 Tenn. App. 434 (M.S. 1932).
44. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. T. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962). This
case involved the sales transaction in which form contracts were exchanged. The
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A considerable number of Tennessee decisions support the rule that
a course of performance, as manifested in the conduct of both parties
to a contract, may be used to show the meaning of a provision which
is ambiguous.4 5 Section 2-20846 of the Code provides:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and op-
portunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance ac-
cepted without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement or to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent
with such course of performance.
It is immediately obvious that this provision setting out that a course
of performance is always relevant to a determination of the meaning of
the contract is contrary to the judicial decisions cited earlier, which
have stated or held that the course of performance under a contract
or the practical interpretation of the parties themselves only applies in
cases where the contract is ambiguous and the intention doubtful.
Official comment 1 states that this section completes the "set of factors"
which determine the meaning of the agreement. The other two, as
mentioned in section 2-208(a), are course of prior dealing (between
these parties) and usage of trade (section 1-205). The statement in
official comment 1 that what the parties do under their agreement is
the best indication of what it means has been criticized as a "brocard"
giving "considerable advantage to the nervy and persistent contract-
breaker, who, as against a less aggressive opponent, tries to bull his
way through a course of conduct which does not satisfy the explicit
terms of the contract. 47
Most of us, if not all, learned in our first semester in law school that
the famous (or is it infamous?) pre-existing duty rule makes impossi-
ble the enforcement of a contract modification where the person agree-
ing to the modification has changed his mind. Section 2-209, the gen-
eral purpose of which, according to official comment 1, is "to protect
and make effective all necessary desirable modifications of sales con-
tracts without regard to technicalities which at present hamper such
adjustments," states that "an agreement modifying a contract within
defendant's acknowledgment and invoice included the printed warranty disclaimer
clause. The goods were received and used by the plaintiff. He subsequently instituted
an action for breach of sales warranty and the defendant maintained that such liability
was excluded by the disclaimer clause. For a critical discussion of the court's decision
in Roto-Lith, see Note, 3 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rrv. 573 (1962).
45. See, e.g., Canton Cotton Mills v. Bowman Overall Co., 149 Tenn. 18, 257 S.W.
398 (1923); Frierson v. International Agricultural Co., 24 Tenn. App. 616, 148 S.W.2d
27 (M.S. 1940).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-208(1) (repl. vol. 1964).
47. 1 N.Y.L.R. CommN REP. 637 (1955).
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this Article needs no consideraion to be binding." This reverses a rule
which has obtained in Tennessee at least since 1857.48
It is to be noted that, although section 2-209 permits oral modifica-
tion without consideration, if the original contract was within the
Statute of Frauds, then section 2-201 (Statute of Frauds) must be
satisfied as to the waiver or modification as well. To allay any fear
that the abrogation of the pre-existing duty rule might lead to the
extortion of modifications by one seeking to escape duties of perform-
ance under the contract, the second paragraph of official comment 2
points out that the forcing of a modification on one party by the
other "without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a viola-
tion of the duty of good faith."
III. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF CONTRACT
Part 3 of Article 2 contains provisions relating to unconscionable
contracts, allocation of risks, payment of the purchase price, delivery
output and requirements contracts, mercantile terms and sales warran-
ties. Of these, the sections relating to unconscionability, output and re-
quirements contracts, and sales warranties are the most important, and
the discussion here shall be limited to these sections, with emphasis
on the first and last.
A. "Unconscionability"
Section 2-302 offers protection against "unconscionable" contracts
or clauses therein.49 When it is found, as a matter of law, that the con-
tract or any clause therein was unconscionable at the time it was made,
the court has the option: (1) to limit the application of such clause;
(2) to strike the clause and enforce the balance of the contract; or
(3) to refuse to enforce the contract. The comment to this section
points out that the purpose is merely to allow courts to do directly what
they already do by indirection. This section will make substantial
changes in Tennessee law by opening the door to claims of "uncon-
scionable clauses" much more broadly than before. About as far as
Tennessee courts have gone is to state that where one construction
would make a contract unusual, extraordinary, and harsh, and another
48. See Bryan v. Hunt, 36 Tenn. 543 (1857).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-302 (repl. vol. 1964). "Unconscionable contract or
clause-(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to the
court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination."
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construction, equally consistent with the language employed, would
make it reasonable, fair, and just, the latter construction will prevail.50
A much more typical statement is that "it is the court's function to in-
terpret and enforce contracts as written, though they may contain
terms which may be thought harsh and unjust."51
This section has been criticized on the ground that the fairness or
unfairness of a transaction may not be as apparent to a court when
there is litigation about the contract as when it was viewed by the
parties earlier under different circumstances. 52 Furthermore, it has
been suggested that the section may give birth to a great deal of liti-
gation, since "what is unconscionable under any given set of facts is
obviously a very difficult thing for anyone to determine." Corman has
effectively answered these criticisms by pointing out that it is for the
court to determine whether or not a clause in a contract is unconscion-
able, and that the court will be aided in making its determination by
evidence presented as to the commercial setting of the contract or
clause and its purpose and effect.
53
In the author's view no valid objection has been presented to section
2-302. There is a well established analogy in Tennessee law, it is be-
lieved, in the general rule that a provision in a contract which purports
to prescribe the damages for one or more breaches of its provisions will
not be enforced if the amount stipulated is to operate in terrorem, i.e.,
as a penalty.5 Additionally, section 2-302 makes unnecessary the
courts' sometimes painful attempts at interpreting a harsh or inequi-
table provision in a contract so as to attain a result not unconsciona-
ble.5  There is no reason why the court should not be able to refuse the
enforcement of an unconscionable clause in a contract in the same
50. Nashville Terminal Co. v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., 2 Tenn. App. 646 (M.S. 1926).
51. Petty v. Sloan, 197 Tenn. 630, 631, 277 S.W.2d 355, 356 (1955); see also
Smithart v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 513, 71 S.W.2d 1059 (1934);
E. D. Bailey & Co. v. Union Planters Title Guaranty Co., 33 Tenn. App. 439, 232
S.W.2d 309 (W.S. 1949); Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 148 S.W.2d 3
(M.S. 1940). The cases which best illustrate this view are those in which the argument
of unconscionability is based on the claim that one party receives or is to receive a
performance grossly unequal to the value of his own performance; generally, courts
reject such an argument on the ground that the court will not inquire into inadequacy
of consideration in a bargain between persons sui juris and not coerced. See Note,
63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954). It is to be noted, however, that specific performance
of a contract will not be decreed when it is hard or unreasonable in itself, or
when, from material change of circumstances since the contract, the performance
would be attended with any particular hardship. McCarthy v. Kyle, 44 Tenn. 348
(1867); Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (E.S. 1955); Fultz v.
Melcher, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. (1 Higgins) 72 (M.S. 1910).
52. Corman, supra note 3, at 27.
53. Ibid.
54. Railroad v. Cabinet Co., 104 Tenn. 568, 58 S.W. 303 (1900); Schrimpf v. Ten-
nessee Mfg. Co., 86 Tenn. 219, 6 S.W. 131 (1887); see also RESTATEmENT, CoNT'Acrs
§ 339 (1932).
55. See cases cited in UNIFORM CoNimcrciA CODE § 2-302, official comment 1.
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manner as specific enforcement is now refused where the contract
presented is "harsh, inequitable or oppressive." It is true, however,
that the Tennessee courts, in the interpretation of this provision,
should avoid any temptation to remake contracts for persons who are
sui juris, where the contract was not coerced. This section should not
be a refuge for the scoundrel who is merely wishing to avoid a contract
which has, subsequent to the making thereof, become unprofitable or
disadvantageous to him.
B. Output and Requirements Contracts
Contracts which require that the promisor provide all of a certain
item which the promisee shall require during a given period, and con-
tracts in which the promisor agrees to buy all the output of the prom-
isee during a specific period have been the source of considerable
difficulty over the years. Although such contracts have been held
valid in Tennessee, in some states they have been struck down as being
too indefinite to be enforceable, or on the ground that such a contract
lacks mutuality of obligation. 56 Output and requirement contracts
serve significant business needs by tailoring the quantity prescribed
in the contract to the future operations of seller or buyer. Contracts
for the sale of total output assure the seller of a market at capacity
production and avoid the burdens of marketing and the risks of over-
production; a buyer normally would be induced to assume these bur-
dens and risks by a price concession. On the other hand, contracts to
supply requirements are normally designed to assure the buyer of
needed supplies, and may be attractive to the seller in assuring him of
buyer's patronage for a prescribed period. Section 2-30657 of the Code
validates such contracts, further requiring the reading of commercial
background and intent into the language of any agreement and de-
manding good faith in the performance of the agreement. In neither
respect does it alter prior Tennessee law.58
C. Warranties
The Code substantially continues the policy of the Uniform Sales
Act with regard to warranties of title by seller as to the rightfulness of
the transfer of goods and their freedom from encumbrances of liens
not known by the buyer at the time of the contract. The sections on
sales warranties-2-213 through 2-318-make, however, a number of
56. See Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REv.
1 (1932); Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 654 (1954).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-306 (repl. vol. 1964).
58. The leading case in Tennessee is Hardwick v. American Can Co., 113 Tenn. 657,
88 S.W. 797 (1904); see also Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co.,
121 Fed. 298 (6th Cir. 1903).
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significant changes which should be noted. The warranty of quiet
possession is abolished by the Code, on the theory that disturbance of
quiet possession is but one way of establishing a breach of warranty of
title.59
The express warranty has continued to gain in prominence and the
Code reflects this trend by broadening its coverage to transactions
which formerly were only within the bounds of implied warranties.
This extended coverage affords the buyer additional protection against
a disclaiming seller who seeks without the purchaser's consent to limit
his obligation under the sale or contract sale, and is consistent with
the Code changes with respect to warranties reflecting a trend toward
greater consumer protection.
The express warranty was narrowly defined under the Sales Act as:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods
is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or prom-
ise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases
the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor
any statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.60
Where the Sales Act limited the express warranty only to affirma-
tions of fact or promises of the seller which have a natural tendency to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods in reliance thereon, the Code
has extended the application of the express warranty to sales by
descriptions and to sales by sample or model.61 The Code also substi-
tutes the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain,"62 in place of the
words "natural tendency" and "purchasers ... relying thereon" in the
Sales Act provision set out above.
Warranties arising from sales by description and by sample are
classified as implied warranties under the Sales Act, obligating the
59. See Unom COMMERCaL CODE § 2-312, official comment 1. Section 2-725 of
the Code provides for a four year statute of limitations and this four year period could
conceivably expire before the buyer's right of possession is disturbed. Corman has
pointed out, "however, the advantages of clear questions as to title within a relatively
short time, coupled with the infrequency of quiet possession actions involving the sale
of personal property was felt sufficient justification for the elimination of the separate
warranty." Corman, supra note 3, at 28. See also 1 N.Y.L.R. Coan 'N. REP. 122
(1954); Lattin, Article 2: Sales, 23 OMo ST. L.J. 185 (1962). But cf. Hall, Article 2:-
Sales-"From Status to Contract?," 1952 Wis. L. REv. 209, 215-16.
60. TENN. CODE Am. § 47-1212 (1956).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-313(1) (repl. vol. 1964) provides: "Express warranties
by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes a part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise. (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an





seller only to the extent of supplying goods which reasonably conform
to the description, 63 or in the case of sale by sample supplying bulk in
reasonable conformity with the sample.6 Professor Williston and
others have criticized the failure of the Sales Act to allow for an express
warranty in sales by description, and the draftsmen of the Code, being
cognizant of the problem, left no room for ambiguity by creating an
express warranty under section 2-313 in all sales involving a descrip-
tion or descriptive language.
The warranty of merchantability represents perhaps one of the most
significant changes made by the Code. If the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of the kind sold, a warranty of merchantability is im-
plied, unless excluded or modified. The Uniform Sales Act 5 and the
common law decisions preceding it limited applications of the implied
warranty of merchantability to sellers who dealt in goods of that
description, and this position is continued by the Code. Though there
have been some criticism of this provision, as has been pointed out,
"there seems no reason why any person who sells goods should not
make an implied warranty that they are merchantable."
66
The long disputed issue of whether the sale of food to be consumed
on the premises constituted a sale under which the seller could be liable
for breach of warranty is conclusively settled by the Code.67 Whether
the food be consumed on the premises or taken elsewhere, it will be,
for the purposes of a warranty of merchantability, a sale of goods and
not a furnishing of services with the sale of food being only inciden-
tal.68 Although no Tennessee decision has been found dealing with the
problem, courts in other jurisdictions have at times resorted to the
legal fiction that the buyer had made known his purpose and that he
purchased in reliance upon the skill and judgment of the seller, thus
qualifying under the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Such
fiction need no longer be resorted to under the Code since the warran-
ty of merchantability is applicable in all sales of food.
69
63. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1214 (1956).
64. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1216 (a) (1956).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1215(2) (1956).
66. 1 N.Y.L.R. COM n'N REP. 99 (1954).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-314(1) (repl. vol. 1964). This section reverses the
decision in Walton v. Gurthrie, 50 Tenn. App. 383, 362 S.W.2d 41 (W.S. 1962), which
denied the existence of any warranty as to a barbecued ham hock purchased by the
plaintiff, who suffered dire consequences from the eating thereof.
68. UN-oRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, official comment 5. Some jurisdictions
have held that there are no sales warranties where food is purchased and consumed
on the premises on the ground that the transaction was not a sale. See, e.g., Valeri
v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Childs Dining Hall v. Swingler, 173
Md. App. 490, 197 Atl. 105 (1938).
69. The non-food cases where both goods and services are furnished have plagued
the courts. In Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954),
the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the furnishing of diseased blood for which
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Disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is permitted
under section 2-316(2)" ° with the safeguard that such disclaimer must
mention merchantability and, in the case of a writing, must be con-
spicuous. Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded by the use
of general language; however, the disclaimer must be both in writing
and conspicuous. It is assumed that the word "all" in section 2-316(3)
(a) does not include the implied warranty of title. If language such
as "as is" or "with all faults" excludes the implied warranty of title, this
section changes the law of Tennessee.7' It has been suggested that the
warranty of title may be protected by judicial application of the intro-
ductory phrase to section 2-316(3) (a) -"unless the circumstances in-
dicate otherwise."
Except in a minority of jurisdictions which have deviated from the
norm, the general proposition is that warranty extends only to parties
to the contract, to those persons said to be in privity. The privity doc-
trine, a contractual theory, developed in an era when the buyer was
held to deal at arms length in commercial dealings and social policy
reflected the need for protection of sellers and manufacturers. To some
extent at least the requirement of privity of warranty is eliminated by
Article 2 of the Code. Section 2-318 provides that the sellers express
or implied warranties extend "to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or is a guest in his home if it is reason-
able to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty."
The seller may neither exclude nor limit the operation of section 2-318.
It is submitted that the considerable furor which section 2-318 has
provoked is completely uncalled for. Indeed the courts of Tennessee
have already gone farther than section 2-318.72 The section applies
only to warranties given by the seller and, therefore, does not spe-
cifically include any other party involved in manufacturing or distrib-
uting the goods. The manufacturer does not sell his product directly
to the ultimate retail purchaser and is not included within the lan-
guage of the section. Efforts are already being made to expand the
scope for the sales warranty beyond the language within section 2-318,
the plaintiff patient was charged did not constitute a sale, but was only incidental to
the main function of the hospital. See VOLD, SAIEs § 94 (2d ed. 1959).
70. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-2-316(2) (repl. vol. 1964).
71. See Rundle v. Capitol Chevrolet, Inc., 23 Tenn. App. 151, 129 S.W.2d 217 (M.S.
1939); 1 N.Y.L.R. COMM'N REP. 410 (1955). It has been suggested that "warranty
'of title may be protected by judicial application of the introductory phrase to §
2-316(3) (a)-'unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.'" Corman, supra note 3,
at 31 n.98.




and it will take on great significance only if these efforts are success-
fUl.7 3
D. "Sale or Return" and "Sale on Approval"
The Code makes several needed improvements in the area of "con-
signment sales," "sale or return," and "sale on approval." There has
never been any difficulty in drafting a contract which will provide
clearly either for a "consignment sale" or for a "sale or return." The
difficulty is the drafting of a contract which will enable the seller to
treat it as one or the other as expediency dictates in the light of subse-
quent events. If creditors of the consignee levy on the goods, the
seller wishes it to be a consignment sale, or, more properly speaking,
a consignment for sale; in that case he has the title and the creditors
take nothing. If it is a question of personal property taxes, or a case
of loss, the seller would rather it be a sale or return, in which case title
is in the consignee until the return is made.
Both the Code and the Uniform Sales Act recognize "sales on ap-
proval" and "sale or return" contracts. Former Tennessee law dis-
tinguished between the two contracts by reference to intent as to the
location of title. Section 19, rule 3 of the Uniform Sales Act defines
a "sale or return" as a contract which uses "terms indicating an inten-
tion to make a present sale, but to give the buyer an option to return
the goods instead of paying the price . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The
Uniform Sales Act does not define a "sale on approval," but refers to
contracts under which "goods are delivered to the buyer on approval
or on trial or satisfaction, or, other similar terms ....- 74
The vice of the consignment sale, unless duly curbed, is that it gives
the consignee misleading appearances of wealth. Of course, the pur-
chaser from the consignee in ordinary course of business is protected
because the very purpose of the arrangement is a sale to him. The
creditors of the consignee, even though they rely upon appearances,
are defeated by the retained title of the consignor. Section 2-32675
covers this matter by providing that if the consignee is carrying on
business under any name except that of the consignor, the transaction
shall be treated as a sale or return as far as creditors of the consignee
73. Such efforts in Pennsylvania to expand the scope of the sales warranty beyond
the language within § 2-318 have been unsuccessful; Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F.
Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Facciolo Paving & Const. Co. v. Road Machinery, Inc., 8
Ches. Co. Rep. 375 (Pa. Co. Ct. 1958); Kaczmarkiewicz v. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D. &
C.2d 14 (Co. Ct. 1957).
For a list of recent decisions imposing warranty liability upon a manufacturer who
is not in privity with the injured plaintiff. See Corman, supra note 3, at 33.
74. TENN. CODE: ANN. § 47-1219 (1956). See Newkirk v. Tennessee Metal Culvert
Co., 15 Tenn. App. 417 (M.S. 1932); Sindle v. American Ry. Express Co., 8 Tenn. App.
594 (M.S. 1928).
75. TENN. CODE, ANN. § 47-2-326 (repl. vol. 1964).
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are concerned. There are three exceptions: (a) If the consignee is
generally known to be engaged in selling the goods of others; (b) if
the consignee complies with any applicable law with respect to a sign
giving notice; or (c) if the consignor complies with the filing provi-
sions of Article 9 on Secured Transactions.
Section 2-326 also distinguishes between "sale or return" and "sale
on approval" along functional lines, providing a needed clarification.
The intent of the draftsman is suggested by the statement in official
comment 1 that "every presumption runs against a delivery to a con-
sumer being a 'sale or return' and against a delivery to a merchant for
resale being a 'sale on approval."' Unless otherwise agreed if delivered
goods may be returned by the buyer even though they conform to the
contract, then the transaction is a sale on approval if the goods are de-
livered primarily for use; and a sale or return if delivered primarily for
resale. As we have seen, section 19(3) of the Uniform Sales Act
speaks in conceptual terms and provides no objective guide for distin-
guishing between the two.
Section 2-32776 of the Code settles two matters not covered by the
Uniform Sales Act and not altogether clear under the cases. In the
case of a sale on approval, section 2-327(1) (c) provides that, after due
notification of an election to return, the return is at seller's risk and
expense. However, a merchant buyer is required to follow any reason-
able instructions. Under section 2-327(2) in case of a sale or return,
the option to return (unless otherwise agreed) extends to the whole of
any commercial unit of the goods while in substantially their original
condition, but must be exercised reasonably; and the return is at the
buyer's risk and expense.
IV. TrrLE, CREDrros AN GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS
A. Abandonment of Title Concept
Professor Williston has stated that by minimizing the consequences
of title passing in almost all situations and abandoning the search for
presumed intention about title passing in the remaining cases, the
Code has departed "from the long-established tests for determining
title and the consequences of title or the lack of it."77 This he finds the
most objectionable and irreparable feature of the sales part of the
Code. Certainly there can be no doubt that the question of the pass-
ing of the title has been resorted to "as a solvent of the work-a-day
problems of the market, and to nearly everything in sales outside of
warranty." No other provision of the Code so materially alters pre-
existing law.
76. TEiNN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-327 (repl. vol. 1964).
77. Williston, supra note 1, at 570.
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Of the title analysis approach, Professor Latty has commented as
follows:
The rules of the Uniform Sales Act and their common law counterparts
(with their varying degrees of conflict of authority that we have come to
expect as natural) seem on the surface easy to grasp. True, we sometimes
have misgivings about the reality of ascertaining the presumed intent of
the parties about something that they didn't think about, but we are accus-
tomed to similar "flnding" of the intent of the legislature and statutes and
of parties and contracts. Moreover, the judicial opinions on title-passing,
in isolated cases, seem on the whole to "read well" and to come to a "good"
result. It is when you begin to dig below the surface that you strike trouble
and confusion; and the further you dig the greater the confusion; and while
I cannot claim where you end when you "exhaust" the explorations, I ven-
ture that the more you explore the more you become willing to take either
side on an alleged title-passing question in most cases.78
The conception of title and the almost hopeless task of ascertaining
the precise moment of the passage of title are abandoned in the Code
in favor of a more pragmatic approach which does not resort to finding
nonexistent title-intention. There is, however, of course, no way in
which the Code could avoid the problems which have been heretofore
attempted to be solved by the use of the title concept. It is further-
more true that the ultimate result in many cases will not vary material-
ly from that reached by the indirect process of first locating title to the
goods.
In lieu of resort to the finding of "an intention about something that
laymen in business deals don't think about and hence don't express
themselves about," 79 the approach of the Code is to come to grips
directly with the issue to be resolved. Although the final result may
be the same as that which would have obtained under the Uniform
Sales Act, the question of the passage of title will have no real signifi-
cance. Thus, for example, if the question presented is whether the
buyer has obtained an insurable interest in the goods, section 2-50180
dealing specifically with "insurable interest in goods" must be resorted
to; a question of the location of risk of loss in the absence of breach,
section 2-509;1 the location of risk of loss in the event of breach, sec-
tion 2-510;82 and the seller's right to obtain the purchase price of the
goods, section 2-709.83
Although a lawyer handling a sales problem under the Code should
first explore sections within Article 2 that may relate to the issue in-
78. Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW & CONrFMP. Paou. 3, 9
(1951).
79. Id. at 10.
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-501 (repl. vol. 1964).
81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-509 (repl. vol. 1964).
82. TENN. CODE: ANN. § 47-2-510 (repl. vol. 1964)
83. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-709 (repl. vol. 1964,
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volved, when he is satisfied that there is no specific section on point, he
may turn to section 2-401.8 This section recognizes that determining
many of the issues between buyers and sellers and in fixing the rights
of third parties, reference must be made to the concept of "title" or"property." Section 2-401 of the Code prescribes general rules on the
passage of tide, and is designed as a stopgap for problems not covered
by a specific rule. The preamble to section 2-401 emphasizes its limit-
ed scope:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and
remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such
title. Insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions of this
Article and matters concerning title become material the following rules
apply ....
The official comments to section 2-401 would suggest that the sec-
tion is of little importance, but it may very well be that experience
will show the concept of "title" to be a very difficult bird to kill
indeed.
8 5
B. The "Voidable Title" Problem
Prior Tennessee law, the law in general, and the Code are in har-
mony on the proposition that one can pass no better title to goods than
he himself possesses, unless the actual owner is estopped by his own
conduct from denying the seller's authority to sell.86 Subsection (1)
of section 2-40387 of the Code, which provides that a person with
voidable title has power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser
for value, is merely a restatement of existing law. However, the sec-
tion also provides that when the goods have been delivered under a
transaction of purchase, the purchaser has such power even though
the delivery was in exchange for a check later dishonored,88 or where
it was agreed that the transaction was to be a cash sale.
A more difficult question than that presented by the bad check
situation can hardly be conceived in the law of sales. The difficulty
is well illustrated by the case of Young v. Harris-Cortner Co.8 9 In that
84. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-401 (repl. vol. 1964).
85. See the numerous cases cited in the annotation to this section in UNrFORm LAws
ANN., UNIFORM COMMNERCIAL CODE.
86. For an example of the application of such estoppel, see Mayer v. Catron, 48
S.W. 255 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898).
87. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-403(1) (repl. vol. 1964).
88. This is a reversal of the existing rule in Tennessee. Ohio Motors, Inc. v. Russell
Willis, Inc., 193 Tenn. 524, 246 S.W.2d 962 (1952); Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152
Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924); Dllard & Coffin Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 150 Tenn.
195, 263 S.W. 87 (1923); Edwards v. Central Motor Co., 38 Tenn. App. 577, 277
S.W.2d 413 (M.S. 1954), aff'd, 198 Tenn. 50 (1955). It has been stated that the
market overt does not obtain in this state. Parham v. Riley, 44 Tenn. 5 (1867)
89. 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125 (1924).
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case Young, a farmer, delivered ten bales of cotton to McNamee, and
received in return therefor a check for over seven-hundred dollars.
The check was deposited the next day in the bank of Bolivar, and upon
presentment to the payee bank, was dishonored because of insufficient
funds. On the day of the sale McNamee delivered the cotton to a
warehouse and delivered warehouse receipts to Harris-Cortner. Upon
the dishonor of the check, Young sought to replevy the cotton from
the warehouse company and Harris-Cortner, the innocent subpurchas-
er. The supreme court, after considerable mental gymnastics, conclud-
ed that Young intended to sell the cotton to McNamee for cash only,
and that title to the cotton did not pass until the check was honored.
It was further held Young had done nothing which would estop him to
recover the goods from the innocent subpurchaser.
The "cash sale" rule is a harsh one indeed, and has frequently
worked real injustices in those cases involving the retail sale of an
automobile where an intermediate buyer gives the initial seller a
worthless check and then resells the automobile to a bona fide pur-
chaser for value before the check is returned. Unless the ultimate pur-
chaser can establish some basis for estoppel, the initial seller prevails.
It is highly questionable whether or not a rule which seems to have
been engendered by a solicitous attitude toward the farmer in an
agrarian society has any place in present day commercial law.90 Sec-
tion 2-403, of course, represents a substantial alteration of former
Tennessee law.
V. PERFORMANCE
Part 5 of Article 2 involves the various aspects of contract perform-
ance, including insurable interest in the goods, manner and effect of
seller's tender of delivery, shipment, risk of loss, payment of purchase
price and right of inspection. Many of the provisions within Part 5
are clarifications of comparable sections within the Uniform Sales
Act.91 Sections 2-501 through 2-507 are primarily codifications of exist-
ing commercial practice, with a few changes of interest to the prac-
ticing attorney.
A. "Identification"
Section 2-501 is primarily devoted to defining the concept of "identi-
90. The inequity of this situation is well illustrated by those cases in Tennessee
where automobiles have been reclaimed from good faith purchasers by original vendors.
See, e.g., Ohio Motors, Inc. v. Russell Willis, Inc., 193 Tenn. 524, 246 S.W.2d 962
(1952); Edwards v. Central Motor Co., supra note 88. Cf. Hunter v. Moore, 38 Tenn.
App. 533, 276 S.W.2d 754 (E.S. 1954).
91. It has been stated that "much of Part 5 of the Code dealing with problems of
performance by parties to the sales contract would simply tidy up areas already covered
by the Uniform Sales Act." Steinheimer, Effects of Uniform Commercial Code on
Michigan Sales Law, 40 MicH. ST. B.J. 12, 17 (1961).
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fication" of goods to a sales contract. In addition, the section lays
down rules governing the insurability of goods by a buyer and seller.
The Uniform Sales Act does not employ "identification" as a sep-
arate concept. Instead, that act speaks in terms of goods which are
"specific or ascertained."92 There is a close relationship between these
latter terms and "identification" under the Code. Thus, section 76(1)93
of the Uniform Sales Act defines "specific goods" as "goods identified
and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale or a sale is made."
(Emphasis added.) The Uniform Sales Act does not define "ascertain."
However, the Uniform Sales Act section 20(1) 94 refers to "a contract
to sell specific goods, or where goods are subsequently appropriated to
the contract." (Emphasis added.) The inference is that "ascertained"
goods under the present Act are those not specific (identified) at the
making of the contract, but which are thereafter "appropriated" to the
contract under the Uniform Sales Act section 19,95 rules 4(1) and 4(2).
"Identification" under section 2-50196 of the Code is more readily
accomplished than "appropriation" under the present Uniform Sales
Act. Under section 19,97 rule 4(1) of the Uniform Sales Act, appropria-
tion requires some degree of concurrence by both parties, for the Act
speaks of appropriation "by the seller with the assent of the buyer, or
the buyer with the assent of the seller. . . ." However, the same sec-
tion adds that "assent may be expressed or implied, and may be given
either before or after the appropriation is made." (Emphasis added.)
This rule that assent to appropriation may be based on implication
leaves considerable room for doubt in particular cases.
Participation by both parties is allowed but not required for "identi-
fication" under the Code. Under subsection (1) (b) of section 2-501,
identification may occur "when goods are shipped, marked, or other-
wise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers."
(Emphasis added.)
The buyer's insurable interest arises as soon as existing goods are
"identified" to the contract and the seller's insurable interest continues
so long as the seller retains any security interest in the goods. Thus
for a considerable period during a sales transaction both parties may
have an insurable interest.
B. Cure
Section 2-601 of the Code contains a sweeping rule favoring rejec-
tion which presents considerable opportunity for abuse.98 Buyers in a
92. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1218 (1956).
93. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1276(1) (1956).
94. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1220(1) (1956).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1219 (1956).
96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-501 (repl. vol. 1964).
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1219 (1956).
98. 1 N.Y.L.R. Comlm'N REP. 482-83 (1955).
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declining market are tempted to search for some way to avoid respon-
sibility under contracts made when the market was higher, and may
attempt to shift the loss to the seller by rejecting the goods on the
ground of some slight incidental defect in the seller's performance.
The Code in section 2-50899 introduces the new concept of "cure" and
grants to the seller varying rights to "cure," depending upon whether
he attempts to cure the non-conforming delivery prior to or after the
date for performance. In effect, and within limited circumstances, the
section gives the seller a second chance to comply with the contract.
Subsection (1) of section 2-508 reads: "Where any tender or de-
livery by the seller is rejected because of non-conforming and the time
for performance has not yet expired, the seller may reasonably notify
the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract
time make a conforming delivery." 10 As can be seen, the opportunity
for a second tender is sharply limited. In the first place, the seller's
conforming delivery must be made "within the contract time." Fur-
thermore, as Professor Williston has pointed out, a second tender may
not be effective if the original defective tender was made under cir-
cumstances which warranted the buyer in believing that the tender
was the only one which would be made. Under such circumstances,
the buyer may change his position, and if he does so a subsequent
conforming tender by seller, even though within the contract time, in
all probability need not be accepted. 101
Subsection (2) of section 2-508102 covers the seller's right to cure
after the date for performance. Here the seller's rights are even more
limited. The seller must have had reasonable grounds to believe that
the tender of non-conforming goods would be acceptable, either with
or without a money allowance. Under such circumstances if he season-
ably notifies the buyer, he is afforded a further reasonable time in
which to substitute a conforming tender. This subsection prevents the
buyer from forcing the seller to breach by making a surprise rejection
of the goods because of some minor non-conformity, the rejection com-
ing at such late date that the seller cannot cure the deficiency within
the time for performance prescribed by the contract.
10 3
C. Risk of Loss
In the resolution of no other problem under the Uniform Sales Act,
99. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-508 (repl. vol. 1964).
100. This is a codification of an existing Tennessee rule. See MacBeth v. Jones Cotton
Co., 149 Fed. 383 (6th Cir. 1906).
101. Cf. 2 WILLIsTON, SALES § 459 (rev. ed. 1948).
102. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-508(2) (repl. vol. 1964).
103. See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BuLx SALES UNDER THE UNIFOnRM COMMIERCIAL
CODE 120-22 (1958). Some have argued that the language, "the seller had reasonable
grounds to believe" is vague and will produce difficult questions in litigation. Corman,
s-upra note 3, at 40.
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and under common law of which the Sales Act is generally a reflection,
was the concept of title so frequently resorted to as in the placing of
risk of loss of goods sold. Indeed, "title" was the shibboleth on which
risk of loss questions were invariably resolved. The stated approach
of the draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code "is the adoption
of the contractual approach rather than an arbitrary shifting of the
risk with the 'property' in the goods."1°4 Under the Code, risk of loss
is no longer tied up with any passage of title but it is delivery which
is the controlling factor. As is readily obvious, the greatest change
here is in the approach, not in the result which will normally be
attained.
Section 2-509 provides two distinct sets of rules on risk of loss, the
applicability of which depends on whether the contract requires the
seller to ship the goods. Section 2-509(1)105 makes risk of loss turn on
whether the contract requires the seller "to deliver at destination." If
not, risk passes to buyer when the goods are "delivered to the carrier."
If seller does have such an obligation to deliver at destination, risk
remains on seller until at destination the goods are "duly tendered."
This statutory structure closely resembles that of the Uniform Sales
Act. Under section 19, rule 4(2), when seller delivers goods to a car-
rier "he is presumed to have unconditionally appropriated goods to
the contract." This contemplates that title passes to the buyer and that
he, therefore, bears the risk of loss while the goods are in transit.10 6
This rule is, however, subject to an exception under section 19, rule 5,
which provides:
If the contract to sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer,
or at a particular place, or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to
the buyer, or to a particular place, the property does not pass until the
goods have been delivered to the buyer or reached the place agreed upon.
104. UNiF oM ComMERcrAL CODE § 2-509, official comment 1.
105. "(1) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by
carrier (a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, the
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier even
though the shipment is under reservation (Section 2-505); but (b) if it does require
him to deliver them at a particular destination and the goods are there duly tendered
while in possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods
are there duly so tendered as to enable the buyer to take delivery."
Although this language of Section 2-509(1) appears to be a complete statement of
the rules governing risk of loss in contracts which call for shipment, several other
sections of the Code set forth more specific rules on this problem. Thus, under section
2-319, if the contract employs the term "F.O.B. place of shipment" seller bears the
"risk of putting [the goods] into the possession of the carrier," but buyer thereafter
bears the risk; if the term is "F.O.B. the place of destination" the seller must "at his
own expense and risk transport the goods to that place .... . The same section deals
with risk in F.A.S. shipments; section 2-320 deals with risk in C.I.F. and C. & F. con-
tracts; section 2-322 deals with risk when the contract calls for delivery "exship." See
Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels, Past, Present and Com-
mercial Code, 46 MiNN. L. REv. 697 (1962).
106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1222 (1956).
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The Uniform Sales Act thus equates an obligation "to deliver" with an
obligation "to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the buyer;"
in both instances there is a presumption that risk of loss in transit re-
mains on the seller.107
If the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being
moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of a negotia-
ble document of title covering the goods, or on acknowledgment by
the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the goods, or after his
receipt of a non-negotiable document of title or other written direc-
tions to deliver, as provided in subsection (2) (b) of section 2-509.111
If neither of these situations exist and there is no breach, the risk of
loss is based on whether the seller is a "merchant."'0 With non-mer-
chants, the risk of loss passes to the buyer on tender of delivery. This
provision tends more strongly to hold risk of loss on seller than does the
Uniform Sales Act, and has provoked considerable controversy.110
Section 2-5101' is designed to qualify the general provisions on risk
of loss in section 2-509 so as to throw risk on a party who is in breach
of contract." 2 These rules pinning risk of loss on the party who has
broken his sales contract are, however, modified by provisions in sub-
sections (2) and (3) which hold the risk on the innocent party to the
extent that he has insurance. The net effect is that if one party is in
breach, insured loss falls on the insurance company; the uninsured
loss falls on the party in breach.
Section 2-510(3) states that if one of the parties is in breach of con-
tract, the aggrieved party "may to the extent of any deficiency in his
effective insurance coverage treat the risk of loss as resting on" the de-
faulting party. It will be noted that this section has no impact on the
rules of section 2-509 which control risk in the absence of breach. The
insurance deficiency assigned to the breaching party must exist with-
out subrogation, and the section merely distributes the risk of loss as
107. See Note, 12 TENN. L. REv. 61 (1933).
108. Tm. CODE ANN. § 47-2-503(4) (b) (repl. vol. 1964).
109. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-509(3) provides that "in any case not within
subsection (1) nor (2), the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods
if the seller is a merchant; otherwise, the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery."
110. See Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. Cm. L.
REV. 427 (1950). See also 1 N.Y.L.R. ComM'N REP. 137 (1954). Section 2-509(2)
probably changes the result in the famous case of Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360, 108
Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827), which was codified by section 19 of the Uniform Sales Act.
In that case the seller agreed to sell the buyer a certain stack of hay then standing in
a field owned by seller's brother-in-law; buyer was not to take the hay until he paid
the price. Before the date for payment and delivery the stack burned. The court held
that since the contract referred to a specific stack of hay and seller had nothing further
to do, "title" passed to the buyer when the contract was made; he, therefore, bore the
risk of loss.
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-510 (repl. vol. 1964).
112. Subsections (1) and (2) deal with breach by seller; and subsection (3) deals
with breach by buyer.
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stated, without intent that this distribution be disturbed by-any subro-
gation of an insurer." 3 This is pretty clearly a "soak the insurance com-
pany" device, and, as Latty has pointed out, it may very well be that
"sharp drafters of insurance policies will try to work out clauses to
make the insurance non-effective under these Code provisions." 14
VI. BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
Part 6 of Article 2 contains little which is startling or changes prior
statutory and decisional law. The buyer, prior to his acceptance of the
goods, is afforded three alternative courses in the event that either the
goods or tender thereof fail, in any respect, to conform to the contract.
He may accept the whole, reject the whole, or accept any commercial
unit or units and reject the rest."5 It is immediately apparent that the
Code, by permitting the buyer to reject if the goods or tender fail in
any respect to conform to the contract, places in the hands of the buyer
a powerful weapon which he may very well not hesitate to utilize. For
this reason section 2-601 of the Code which grants to the buyer the
alternatives mentioned has been severely criticized." 6
A. Rejection of Goods by Buyer
Should the buyer elect to reject, the Code provides guide lines both
as to the manner and effect of rightful rejection and as to the duties
and privileges of the buyer in connection with the disposition of the
rightfully rejected goods.
Section 2-602117 of the Code outlines the steps which the buyer must
follow if he rejects goods because of the seller's breach of contract.
Should the buyer fail to follow these rules, he may be deemed to have
"accepted" the goods, and will consequently become responsible to
the seller for the contract price. For the most part, the Code's rules on
rejection follow former law. Rejection of goods must be within a rea-
sonable time after their delivery or tender and the buyer must season-
ably notify the seller." 8 Should a buyer exercise any badges of owner-
113. UNIFOM1% COMMERCIAL CODE § -510, official comment 3. See also 1 N.Y.L.R.
ComEI'N REP. 499 (1955).
114. Latty, supra note 78, at 16.
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-601 (repl. vol. 1964).
116. Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1949); Rabel,
supra note 110, at 438. This section's strict rules allowing rejection are qualified at
several points in the Code. Section 2-612 allows rejection in an installment contract only
if there is "substantial impairment" of the value of the installment; section 2-504 allows
rejection only if material delay or loss ensues when seller has failed to make reasonable
provisions for shipment or his failure to notify buyer of shipment.
117. TE'N. CODE ANN. § 47-2-602 (repl. vol. 1964).
118. This provision is similar to section 48 of the Uniform Sales Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-1248 (1956), which provides: "The buyer is deemed to have accepted the
goods . . . when, after the lapse of a reasonable time. he retains the goods without
intimating to seller that he has rejected them."
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ship after he has rightfully rejected non-conforming goods, such con-
duct will be deemed to be wrongful as against the seller."' Where the
buyer has, prior to his rejection, taken possession of goods and has no
security interest in them, he is under duty to hold them with reasona-
ble care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the
seller to move them.
120
These provisions of the Code are slightly more favorable to the
buyers than our present rules governing rescission. Under section
69(1) (d) and (3) of the Uniform Sales Act,' 12 a buyer who rescinds a
sale must, if the goods have been received, "return them or offer to
return them to the seller." The Code imposes no such obligation to
return the goods; it is enough if the buyer "seasonably notifies the
seller" and holds the goods with reasonable care "at the seller's disposi-
tion for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them."
Section 2-603 enlarges the buyer's duties with respect to goods
which he has rejected, even though the rejection was rightful because
of non-conformity of the goods. These duties arise, however, only
when all of the three following factors are present: (1) seller "has no
agent or place of business at the market of rejection," and (2) buyer is
a "merchant" and (3) the goods are in buyer's possession or control.
In such a situation, the buyer is under a duty "to follow any reasonable
instructions received from the seller with respect to the goods and the
absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them for
the seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in
value speedily." 122 It should be noted that this and the preceding sec-
tions involve a merchant buyer; nevertheless there have been criti-
cisms of adding additional duties to the "merchant buyer."1 23 If a mer-
chant buyer decides to reject non-conforming goods in the manner
specified in section 2-602, and such goods are either perishable or
threaten to speedily decline in value, he is charged with the duty to
sell them for the seller's account. In addition if the seller has no agent
or place of business at the point of rejection, the merchant buyer is
under a duty, after he has rejected the goods in his possession or con-
trol, to follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller with
respect to the goods. However, if the merchant buyer's demand for
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-602(2) (a) (repl. vol. 1964).
120. TEmrr. CoDE; ANN. § 47-2-602(2) (b) (repl. vol. 1964). It has been suggested
that the exception in subsection (2) (b) for instances in which buyer has a security
interest may be expressed in a manner which could cause confusion.
121. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1269(1) (d) (1956).
122. Tsarr. CODE ANN. § 47-2-603(1) (repl. vol. 1964).
123. It has been pointed out that any buyer who rejects goods in his possession
should be under an obligation to follow reasonable instructions from the seller with
respect to the goods. 1 N.Y.L.R. CoMn'N REP. 102 (1954). But see reply by Llewellyn,
1 N.Y.L.R. COMM'N REP. 166 (1954).
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indemnity for his expenses is not forthcoming the seller's instructions
are not reasonable.
While section 2-603 imposes certain duties on the rejecting merchant
buyer, section 2-604 grants the buyer certain privileges in connection
with the disposing of goods rightfully rejected. The purpose of the
section is to remove the hazards which otherwise might follow when
one deals with another's goods. 1'
B. Reasons for Rejection of Pelormance
Section 2-60512 of the Code deals with a problem which has proved
troublesome not only in sales law but also in connection with the per-
formance of other types of contracts. One party tenders performance;
the other party refuses to accept performance, and in later litigation
seeks to justify his rejection by objections to the tendered performance
which he did not specify at the time of rejection. In this setting it has
on occasion been possible to invoke doctrines of "waiver" or "estoppel"
to bar the new objection. Under section 2-605, if the sales transaction
is between merchants and the buyer rejects the goods for non-con-
formity, the seller may request in writing a full and final written state-
ment of all defects upon which the buyer proposes to rely. Once such
a written request has been made, the buyer who fails to state a par-
ticular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection is pre-
cluded from relying upon such defect either to justify his rejection or
to establish breach. This section has no counterpart in existing Ten-
nessee case law; it has been criticized on at least two grounds. Some
have criticized it because it is limited to transactions between mer-
chants; 126 others have criticized the section on the ground that it may
be a trap, since it requires the setting forth of all defects, as opposed
to all material defects. 27
C. "Revocation of Acceptance"
The concept of rescission is not used in the Code. Consistent with
the abandonment of the title approach in its place has been substituted
the concept of "revocation of acceptance."'2 Unlike the Uniform Sales
Act which contains no provision on the degree of materiality of breach
by seller such as will entitle the buyer to reject or rescind, other than
the general provision of section 69(1)129 that, "where there is a breach
124. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-602(2) (repl. vol. 1964); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-2-606(1)(c) (repl. vol. 1964).
125. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-605 (repl. vol. 1964).
126. "[A]ny buyer should answer the seller's written request." Williston, The Law
of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAav. L. REv. 561, 584 (1950).
See also 1 N.Y.L.R. Commr'N RPp. 523 (1955).
127. See N.Y.L.R. COMM'N REP. 390-91 (1956).
128. TENN. CODE: ANN. § 47-2-608 (repl. vol. 1964).
129. TE N. CODE ANN. § 47-1269(1) (1956).
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of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election.., reject...
or rescind.. ." and also unlike section 2-601 of the Code which gives
the buyer the right to "reject" if the goods deviate from the contract
"in any respect," section 2-608 of the Code permits the buyer to "re-
voke his acceptance" only where the non-conformity of the goods
"substantially impairs its value to him."
Under section 2-608(1) (a), a buyer's knowledge of a defect at the
time of acceptance does not bar later revocation of acceptance if the
buyer accepted "on the reasonable assumption" that the non-conformi-
ty would be cured and the seller fails to cure the defect. This preserva-
tion of the buyer's right to revoke acceptance while he is reasonably
waiting for seller to cure a defect is doubtless occasioned in part by
the ease with which "acceptance" may be based on "any act incon-
sistent with seller's ownership" in section 2-606(1)(c) 13 Under the
provisions of the Code, both revocation of acceptance and recovery of
damages for breach are available to the buyer. Furthermore, revoca-
tion of acceptance, as well as rejection, may be exercised partially.
131
D. Assurance of Due Performance
What is a seller to do when he learns, after entering into a contract
of sale, that the purchaser is insolvent or very nearly so. Must he ship
the goods, regardless of the information which has come to him? If a
seller is manufacturing goods to the specifications of a buyer whose
ability to accept and pay for the goods becomes questionable, must the
seller continue manufacturing or may he suspend production until the
buyer's position has been clarified? Conversely, if a buyer has reason
to believe that a seller will not be able to supply goods which the buyer
urgently needs, must the buyer remain in doubt about his source of
supply, or may he make a contract with another supplier and refuse a
later tender by the original party?
The question of "insecurity" is, of course, closely related to anticipa-
tory repudiation, but section 2-609132 deals with a situation where the
impairment of expectation of performance falls short of explicit repudi-
ation. There are Tennessee cases from which it could be reasonably
argued that the rights given under section 2-609 are akin to sales con-
tract rights under former Tennessee law,133 but there is at least one case
which suggests a contrary conclusion.134 In any case, under section
2-609 the section may be invoked when "reasonable" grounds for in-
130. Cf. White v. Mid-City Motor Co., 39 Tenn. App. 429, 284 S.W.2d 689 (E.S.
1955).
131. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-608(1) (repl. vol. 1964).
132. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-609 (repl. vol. 1964).
133. See, e.g., Dorman v. Weakley, 39 S.W. 890 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
134. Ault v. Dustin, 100 Tenn. 366, 45 S.W. 981 (1898).
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security arise; the aggrieved party may then demand "adequate" assur-
ance of due performance. This language, of course, gives the courts
broad discretion to determine its application in the light of the needs
of specific cases. It should be pointed out that the official comments
suggest the proper use of this section in several situations.
E. Anticipatory Repudiation
The Uniform Sales Act does not incorporate the principle of the
famous case of Hochster v. De La Tour,13 that the repudiation of an
obligation under a contract, even though the time for performance has
not arrived, constitutes a breach of contract for which an immediate
action lies. The rule of the case is nevertheless the law in Tennessee. 136
Section 2-610137 of the Code both accepts the principle and resolves
some vexing problems which have arisen concerning it. Section
2-610(b) provides that the fact that the aggrieved party has urged
retraction of the repudiation does not eliminate the effect nor deprive
him of his remedies for such repudiation until the retraction is actually
made.
VII. REMEDIES OF THE SELLER AND BUYER
There are few drastic changes made by the Uniform Commercial
Code in the remedies available to the seller and buyer from those
provided for in the Uniform Sales Act. The Code provisions regarding
remedies are, however, a considerable improvement over the pro-
visions of the Uniform Sales Act. First, from a purely formal stand-
point, the Code collects the sections relative to remedies together in
one place rather than scattering them as is the case with the Uniform
Sales Act. Secondly, the Code broadens the remedies presently
available to both the buyer and seller and more nearly conforms the
law to existing commercial understanding of what is fair and
equitable.
In view of space limitations, no attempt will be made to discuss
all the remedy provisions set out in Part 7 of Article 2. Most of the
remedies are familiar to the reader, since they are substantially the
same as those contained in the Uniform Sales Act. We shall rather
limit ourselves here to a brief discussion of those areas in the law of
sales remedies where major innovations are made by the Code.
A. The Reclaiming Seller
One of the most significant changes made by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is the broadened power of reclamation given the seller
135. 2 El. & B1. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
136. See, e.g., Brady v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S.W. 1135 (1911); Ault v.
Dustin, supra note 134.
137. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-610 (repl. vol. 1964).
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by section 2-702.13a This section has already caused trouble, and
bids fair to cause further difficulty. Section 2-702(2) provides that:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent be may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten
days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made
to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the
ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection
the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent
or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
The reclamation right thus given to the seller is limited, however,
by section 2-702(3) which provides that: "Seller's right to reclaim
under Subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary
course or good faith purchaser or lien creditor .... ." (Emphasis added.)
It has been the law for at least a hundred years that sellers who
can prove that the buyer misrepresented his financial condition may
rescind the sale and revest the property interest in the goods in
himself.139 This has been the law in Tennessee at least since 1881.140
Apparently all that the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code
intended by the new reclamation provision was to broaden this exist-
ing right by creating a conclusive presumption that the purchase was
fraudulent where the buyer receives goods while insolvent.14
1
The "well-laid schemes of mice and men" went badly astray in
1960, however, with the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in the celebrated case of In re Kravitz.142
It was there held that the rights of a reclaiming seller were inferior
to those of the trustee in bankruptcy under Section 7 0(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Since the court in Kravitz relied upon section 9-301
of the Uniform Commercial Code which defines "lien creditor" to
include the trustee in bankruptcy, and upon the fact that the seller's
right of reclamation is subject to the rights of "lien creditors," there
has been considerable fear that section 2-702 has had the totally
unintended result of permitting the trustee in bankruptcy always to
prevail over the defrauded seller.143  Indeed, some states have
138. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-702 (repl. vol. 1964).
139. See 3 WmiSTON, SALEs § 638 (rev. ed. 1948).
140. See Belding Bros. & Co. v. Frankland, 76 Tenn. 67 (1881).
141. Professor Karl Llewellyn has explained its purpose to be "to slightly enlarge the
existing law of reclamation by seller when a buyer goes insolvent." 1 N.Y.L.R. Comz'N
REP. 106 (1954).
142. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
143. See Hawkland, "The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded Sellers-
Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 Com.
LJ., 86, 88 (1962).
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amended section 2-702 so as to omit "lien creditors" from those
persons whose rights may not be cut off by a reclaiming seller-'
In re Kravitz relied heavily upon the fact that under ante-Code
law in Pennsylvania a lien creditor does have a higher claim than a
defrauded seller, and as has been pointed out, in all probability the
Kravitz case is an anomaly peculiar to Pennsylvania.
145 It is not
believed that the Kravitz case reasoning will cause any difficulty in
Tennessee. A Tennessee case, Richardson v. Vick,146 specifically holds
that where a purchaser falsely represented that he was solvent and
the seller acted on such representation, the seller could recover the
property, notwithstanding the fact that a valid assignment had been




Under the Uniform Sales Act, the seller was given two separate
and distinct rights of rescission. 148 Where he had reserved the right
to do so or the buyer had been in default an unreasonable length of
time, the seller could rescind the transfer of title. If the seller
rescinded only the transfer of title, he was permitted to recover
damages for the breach of the contract. If he elected to rescind the
entire contract, however, the seller could not, of course, recover
damages for the breach, since the rescission in and of itself was a
declaration that the contract had ceased to exist.
Under Section 2-703149 of the Code, the seller in four enumerated
situations is permitted to "cancer' the contract, without in any way
prejudicing his right to recover damages accruing prior to the "can-
cellation."150 Unlike the Uniform Sales Act, the seller may cancel
144. The legislatures of New York and Illinois have deleted the words "lien creditors"
from their enactment of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-702.
145. The best discussion of the Kravitz case is contained in Kennedy, The Trustee in
Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by
Articles 2 and 9, 14 RuTGas L. REv. 518, 552 (1960).
146. 125 Tenn. 532, 145 S.W. 174 (1911).
147. In all likelihood, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-702, does not represent any
change in existing Tennessee law. As we have seen, Richardson v. Vick, supra note 146,
recognizes the right of the seller to reclaim. In addition, the Code appears to enact
an existing Tennessee rule which permits the seller to reclaim even in those cases
where there has been no actual misrepresentation. See Katzenberger v. Leedom & Co.,
103 Tenn. 144 (1899). The ante-Code rule in Tennessee apparently permitted the
seller to reclaim even in those situations where he had simply "guessed wrong" as to the
solvency of his buyer.
148. TENN. CoDE AusN. § 47-1261(1) (1956).
149. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-703 (repl. vol. 1964).
150. "Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails
to make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part of
the whole, then with respect to any goods directly affected, and if the breach is of the
whole contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered
balance, the aggrieved seller may... cancel."
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even when the goods are in the possession of the buyer. The Sales
Act specifically provided that the goods must not have been delivered
to the buyer if the seller were to rescind the contract.1"'
C. "Cover"
One of the new terms introduced by Part 7 of the Code is "cover,"
which represents an essentially new remedy for the buyer. 1 2 Under
the Sales Act the buyer was limited to the actions of conversion,
replevin, or for wrongful detention, and if title had not passed he
could maintain an action for failure to deliver, but in no instance
was the buyer especially authorized or permitted to procure sub-
stitute goods, regardless of the urgency of his need. Unfortunately,
where the buyer did protect himself by going into the market and
purchasing substitute goods and was required to pay an amount in
addition to the contract price for the items, it was under the Uniform
Sales Act incumbent upon him to prove that the acquisition of the
substitute goods was in the contemplation of the parties at the time
the contract was made, since the additional costs would constitute
special damages.1
53
Under the Code, upon the seller's breach the buyer is permitted
to procure substitute goods to meet his essential need; and the de-
faulting seller is held liable for the damages which the buyer sustains
as a result of the breach, including reasonable expenses incurred in
effecting the cover. Official comment 2 to section 2-712 states that
"the test of proper cover is whether at the time and place the buyer
acted in good faith and in a reasonable manner, and it is immaterial
that hindsight may later prove that the method of cover used was
not the cheapest or most effective." After fulfilling these requirements,
thebuyer can-recover from the seller the difference in the costs of
the substitute goods and the contract price, as well as incidental and
consequential damages, less the expenses saved as a consequence of
the seller's breach. Cover is not mandatory remedy, but if the buyer
chooses not to cover when cover is available, damages which he
151. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-703, provides only that the seller may cancel
wvhen there has been a wrongful rejection, revocation of acceptance, failure to make
payment due or repudiation. That the goods have not been delivered to the buyer is
not made a condition upon which the right to cancel depends.
152. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-712 (repl. vol. 1964): "'Cover'; Buyers Procurement
of Substitute Goods. (1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may
"cover" by making in good faith and without reasonable delay any reasonable purchase
of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller. (2) The
buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover
and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as herein-
after defined (Sec. 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's
breach. (3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him
from any other remedy."
153. See 3 WILLIsToN, SALES, § 599-99b (rev. ed. 1948).
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sustained as a result of his particular need will not be recoverable,
since consequential damages are limtied to those which could not
have been obviated by cover.
D. Specific Performance
Under the Uniform Sales Act, the buyer can obtain specific per-
formance of the contract for "specific or ascertained goods," and the
courts are given very broad discretion in rendering such decrees.
While the Code does not require that the goods be specific or ascer-
tained, it does require that specific performance be decreed only when
the goods are "unique" or in other proper circumstances.'5 Although
the change was accomplished for the purpose of liberalizing the
remedy of specific performance, it has been suggested that the
opposite may have resulted. This is because of uncertainty as to
what are "other proper circumstances" and because the requirement
that goods be specific or ascertained may have been removed and
the more stringent requirement of uniqueness substituted therefor.'55
Such certainly was not the intention of the draftsmen of the Code.
VII. CONCLUSiON
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Sales, represents an
attempt to move away from legal niceties and technicalities in the
law of sales which the modem commercial world neither appreciates
nor wishes to be guided by. At the same time, it is an attempt to
approximate as closely as possible existing commercial understanding
of the sales transaction within the context of existing legal concepts.
After studying it extensively over a period of several months, the
author is firmly persuaded that it is a major improvement over the
Uniform Sales Act, and that once it is better understood, it will be
warmly received by both the business community and the legal pro-
fession in Tennessee.
154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-716(1) (repl. vol. 1964).
155. See HAvKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 144 (1958).
1964]

